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Abstract
We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline
network determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If the
assessment is narrowly focussed on the abilities to obstruct °ows in the existing
system, the main transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, appear to be strong. If
investment options are accounted for, however, Russia achieves clear dominance.
We show that options to bypass one of the transit countries are of little strategic
importance compared to Russia's direct access to its customers through the Baltic
Sea. Comparing the results of our calibrated model with empirical evidence obtained
from transit and import agreements we ¯nd that the Shapley value explains the
power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus.
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Natural gas from the Russian Federation covers about a quarter of Western Eu-
rope's gas consumption. Over four decades, through cold war, economic collapse,
and political turmoil, Russia worked hard to establish a reputation as a secure gas
supplier. However, in January 2009, old con°icts with Ukraine about debts, prices
for Ukraine's gas imports and transit tari®s escalated to the point where supplies
on the major transit route were completely cut o®. For two weeks European gas
consumers were held hostage in the dispute and in the Balkans parts of the pop-
ulations faced a humanitarian emergency when heating systems failed.1 The crisis
tainted Russias reputation as a reliable supplier but it also shed light on the powerful
position of transit countries in the Eurasian supply chain for natural gas.
In this paper we use cooperative game theory to analyze the power structure in the
gas network. We model the interdependencies in the supply chain as a game in value
function form, which is calibrated using information on the cost of di®erent pipelines,
assumptions on demand, etc. The solution of the game allocates to each country a
share in the total pro¯t, which is interpreted as its bargaining power, or power index.
Cooperative game theory allows us to derive the power structure endogenously from
the architecture of the network without involving speci¯c assumptions about details
of the bargaining process, sequencing of moves etc. about which little is known. For
cooperative games various solutions have been proposed, none of which acquired
dominance either on theoretical or empirical grounds. In this paper we compare
three well known solution concepts: the Shapley value, the core, and the nucleolus.
During a crisis, like the January cut-o®, observers tend to focus on the immediate
impact of actions, such as the obstruction or diversion of °ows. From this narrow
and shortsighted perspective, the control of existing transport capacities appears
to be decisive. The status quo, however, can be changed by adding new pipelines
to the existing system. A broad assessment of bargaining power should, therefore,
take into account the options to extend the network as well as the time needed to
realize new investments. The analysis of power will depend on what is considered to
be the relevant scope of the game.2 We vary the scope in two ways. First, we add
1For details on this and previous transit crises see Pirani & Stern & Ya¯mava (2009) and Stern
(2006).
2We use the notion scope in a similar spirit as Brandenburger & Nalebu® (1997), even though
their examples are mainly coined in terms of strategy spaces of players i.e. the non-cooperative
1or withdraw single investment options to study the strategic relevance of particular
pipelines.3 The narrowest possible scope is captured by the `status quo' game, for
which the game's characteristic function (or value function) is derived by allowing
for the usage of existing capacities only. At the other end of the spectrum is the `all
options' game, for which the value of a coalition is derived by allowing for optimal
investment in all pipelines, which do not cross the territory of outsiders. To focus on
the strategic impact of options, however, we initially assume that the projects can be
implemented immediately. In a second step we generalize the game by introducing a
delay in executing options. Intuitively, the faster additional capacities can be made
available, or the more forward looking and patient the players are, the less relevant
will be inertia, hence the status quo for the assessment of power in the `general'
game.
Solving the model numerically, we ¯nd that the scope of the game is of outmost
importance for the assessment of the power structure. Independently of the solution
concept employed (Shapley value, core, or nucleolus), Ukraine and Belarus appear
to be much stronger in the narrowly framed status quo game than in the broad
assessment of the all options game. This observation suggests that delays in imple-
menting options and the players' time preferences are critical for the determination
of the power structure. The choice of the solution concept also matters. The Shapley
value assigns much more power to transit countries than the nucleolus, which, for
our calibration, happens to be in the center of the core. Looking at the impact of
single pipeline options on the Shapley index, we ¯nd that plans for new pipelines,
which have been deliberately designed to weaken particular transit countries, turn
out to have very limited strategic relevance. Similarly, the possibilities to increase
capacities along existing tracks do not change the balance of power dramatically.
The expensive o® shore pipeline through the Baltic Sea, Nord Stream, in contrast,
strengthens Russia's bargaining position more than all other options together. In
a nutshell: in the North-European gas network, competition between Belarus and
Ukraine is of little strategic importance compared to Russia's direct access to its
framework.
3The feasibility of a pipeline project depends on the players' ability to commit to future pro¯t
sharing. If contracts are incomplete, the partners will anticipate recontracting (the hold-up prob-
lem) and a coalition may fail to invest in otherwise bene¯cial projects. For a detailed analysis of
limited commitment, hold-up, and dynamic strategies see Hubert & Ikonnikova (2004) and Hubert
& Suleymanova (2008).
2customers.
Finally, we confront the theoretical results with empirical evidence obtained from
transit arrangements and prices for the transit countries' own gas imports around
2001/2. Such evidence is somewhat speculative because it requires assumptions
about a counterfactuals world without gas exports to Western Europe. This caveat
notwithstanding, we ¯nd that options to invest appear to substantially in°uence
bargaining power, but so does inertia in executing projects. The Shapley value of the
general game yields a surprisingly good prediction for the power indices of Ukraine
and Belarus. The nucleolus in contrast appears to underestimate the power of the
two transit countries. In this sense, the Eurasian gas network provides tentative
non-experimental evidence for the usefulness of the Shapley value in applied studies
of supply chains.
A reader, not particularly interested in gas networks, may read the paper as a case
study in applied cooperative game theory. Overall, cooperative game theory is rarely
used compared to its non-cooperative counterpart. In the theoretical literature on
incomplete contracts the Shapley value is occasionally applied to determine sur-
plus sharing at the ¯nal stage of a non-cooperative sequential game. Grossman &
Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990), and Rajan & Zingales (1998) analyze how non-
contractible investment is a®ected by the assignment of property rights and access
to productive resources. Bolton & Scharfstein (1996) investigate how the number
of creditors a®ects the incentives for opportunistic default. Inderst & Wey (2003)
analyze how mergers a®ect the choice of technology in bilateral oligopolies. For styl-
ized theoretical models the Shapley value comes in handy, because it always exist, is
unique and can be easily calculated. More recently Brandenburger & Stuart (2007)
proposed to analyze strategic decisions by solving the ¯nal stage game with the core,
which, if it exists, is rarely unique. To resolve the indeterminacy they suggest to
use additional assumptions about the players' `con¯dence' in their own bargaining
power. In this paper, we use the nucleolus to select a unique solution in the core.
While there are some merits in discussing the virtues of the di®erent solutions from
a theoretical perspective, eventually, they have to be confronted with real world
problems. Following the pioneering work of Shapley & Shubik (1954) cooperative
notions made some inroads into political science and cooperate ¯nance as a tool
for analyzing the power structure in voting games (Zwiebel (1994), Zingales (1994)).
Here it is often su±cient to distinguish between winning and losing coalitions, so that
3the value function takes only two values, which can be easily calculated by applying
voting rules. Shubik (1962) initiated a second line of literature, in which the Shapley
value is used to allocate common cost. Applications include internal telephone billing
rates (Billera & Heath & Rannan (1978)), water infrastructure (Suzuki & Nakayama
(1976)), central facilities for pro¯t centers (Young (1985b)), and ATM Networks
(Gow & Thomas (1998)). Most of this literature is normative, explaining how cost
should be allocated. A notable exception is Littlechild & Thompsen (1977), who
¯nd that the pattern of landing fees at Birmingham Airport closely matches cost
allocation by the Shapley value but deviates from the nucleolus. Beyond voting
games and cost allocation, however, cooperative game theory has rarely been applied
to real world problems with the aim to obtain quantitative results. To the best of
our knowledge, the present and two companion papers (Hubert & Ikonnikova (2004)
and Hubert & Suleymanova (2008)) are the ¯rst attempts for a quantitative study
of power relations in real world supply chains using cooperative game theory.4
The paper also contributes to the literature on transport systems for natural gas.
There it is typically assumed that gas producers enjoy a ¯rst mover advantage vis-µ a-
vis transit countries or importers, but face severe restrictions in their action space.
Producers may determine the price, while importers react by choosing quantities,
or they may commit to sales, while transit countries respond by setting transit fee
(see e.g Grais & Zheng (1996), Hirschhausen & Meinhart & Pavel (2005)). We
see two major shortcomings of this approach. First, the supply chain su®ers from
ine±ciencies in equilibrium, which result from arti¯cial and often counterfactual
restrictions on feasible contracts. Real world gas contracts are rather sophisticated
and able to avoid most of the ine±ciencies assumed in this literature.5 Second, the
results on power and distribution of pro¯ts are driven by ad hoc assumptions on the
sequencing of decisions. The cooperative approach, in contrast, assumes that the
players negotiate e±ciently and allows to derive their power endogenously from their
role in gas production and transport. Parsons (1989) analyzes the strategic value
of long{term gas supply contracts assuming that the producer designs an auction
to extract revenue from customers with unknown reservation prices. In the present
4For a review of game theoretic notions in supply chain analysis see Cachon & Netessine (2004)
5The European pipeline system was developed under long{term agreements with so called `take{
or{pay' provisions. Contracts stipulate prices and quantities to ensure the e±cient usage of the
capacities and to avoid double marginalization (see Energy Charter Secretariat (2007) for details).
Contracts with transit countries also cover tari®s and quantities.
4paper none of the players has an a priori strategic advantage and information is
complete.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the main
features of the Eurasian supply system for natural gas. In section 3 we develop and
motivate the analytical approach and calibrate the model. The numerical results
are presented and interpreted in section 4. In section 5 we test the model against
empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Supply Chain for Russian Gas
Gas from the Russian Federation is supplied through a network of pipelines stretch-
ing from ¯eld in Eastern Siberia and central Asia to Western and Southern Europe.
For an illustration of the part, which is relevant for this study, see ¯gure 1. The
network's backbone, labeled `Southern System', was already built in Soviet times.
When the Soviet empire disintegrated, Russia emerged as a central player owning
most of the gas ¯elds and essential pipelines but it also became depended on three
newly independent transit countries, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Ukraine.6
Slovakia and Czech Republic privatized their sections of the pipelines and sold them
to western importers. In the following, both countries developed stable commercial
gas relations with Russia and transit never became an issue. Ukraine and Russia,
in contrast, failed to ¯nd a lasting solution for their gas relationship. Ukraine
consolidated its pipeline system in a state owned national monopoly, Naftogas, an
opaque structure, which is in charge of domestic supply and international transit.
Throughout the nineties both sides constantly quarreled over fees for transit service,
which were paid in barter (gas), the price for Ukraine's additional gas imports,
payment arrears, Ukraine's re-exports of Russian gas etc. In this decade the gas
con°ict was only a part of the broader problems of disentanglement and was also
overshadowed by the collapse of the socialist economic system.7
With the economic environment improving and many of the political issues resolved,
the two countries made a new attempt to lay down principles for their gas relations
6For the ease of reference we often use the names of the countries instead of companies, whenever
there is no risk of misunderstanding. Hence we speak of Russia rather than Gazprom, Ukraine
instead of Naftogaz etc.
7For detailed and balanced accounts of the con°icts see Stern (1999) and Stern (2005).
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in 2001. A number of agreements addressed transit fees, prices and quantities for
Ukraine's own gas imports from Russia, and the settlement of controversial debts
resulting from payment arrears. In section 5, we will use these agreements to assess
Ukraine's bargaining power empirically. Although the implementation proved to be
cumbersome, the two countries went on to tackle problems of maintenance and re-
pairs in summer 2004. A Russian-Ukrainian consortium, RosUkrEnergo, was set up
to handle all Ukrainian imports and to operate and refurbish the transit system in
co{operation with Western partners. The agreements even raised hopes for a large
scale expansion of the Southern system including new pipelines, which would bene¯t
from the established infrastructure. However, Ukraine failed to transfer the pipelines
to the consortium, and after the Orange Revolution brought a regime change in De-
cember 2004, the other parts of the deals quickly unravelled. On the background
of soaring international gas prices and deteriorating bilateral relations, the coun-
tries failed to reach an agreement on prices for Ukraine's imports and in January
2006 the Russian curtailed supplies by the amount earmarked for Ukraine's own
consumption. When Ukraine syphoned gas from transit pipelines, Russia quickly
bowed to pressure from Western importers not to taint its reputation as a reliable
supplier. But the con°ict lingered on and erupted again three years later, leading
6to the events described in the introduction.
The protracted con°ict with Ukraine led Russia to search for alternative transit
routes since the early nineties. Initially, e®orts were directed to a new export corridor
through Belarus and Poland. In 1993 Belarus agreed on a 99{year lease of land for
the new pipelines which would be owned by Gazprom and operated by Belarus'
national company BelTransGaz. For the section in Poland a joint stock company,
EuroPolGaz, was established in which Polish PGNiG and Russian Gazprom hold
equal shares. The ¯rst pipeline, now commonly referred to as Yamal 1, went into
operation in 1998. Due to delayed investment in compressor stations it reached its
planned capacity of 28 bcm/a only in 2006. The second pipeline, Yamal 2, with a
potential of another 28 bcm/a, has been already laid at major river crossings, but
its completion seems to be very unlikely by now. In the late nineties, Russia also
pushed plans for a twin{pipeline with a capacity of 60 bcm/a running north{south
through Belarus, Poland and Slovakia. The pipeline, to which we will refer to as
Bypass, would have used existing capacities in Slovakia and Czech Republic, hence,
not increased increased transmission capacities westwards.8 Apparently, the project
has been instrumental in preparing the ground for the 2001 deal between Russia and
Ukraine and it was shelved shortly afterwards.
By the beginning of the new decade relations between Russia and Belarus had al-
ready cooled considerably. Like Ukraine, Belarus leveraged its newly gained strategic
position in the export chain to gain concessions for its own gas imports. In April
2002 Gazprom agreed to deliver gas at Russia's domestic price and to swap accumu-
lated payment arrears for a controlling stake in BelTransGaz. However, the second
part of the deal, which would have given Gazprom more e®ective control over its
export routes, never materialized. In January 2004 Gazprom stopped deliveries to
Belarus because no agreement on prices could be reached. When Belarus started to
divert gas from the export pipeline, Russia shut down all supplies through Belarus,
deliberately cutting o® Poland, Germany, and its own enclave Kaliningrad. The
crisis was solved before costumers in the West were a®ected, but as a consequence
Russia redirected its e®orts to avoid transit countries altogether.
Plans for a direct o®shore connection between Vybourg (Russia) and Germany have
8To add credibility to the plans, a consortium was set up for the sections in Poland and Slovakia
including among others Gazprom (18%), PGNiG (10%), SNAM (29%), Ruhrgas (22%), Gas du
France (12%), and Wintershall (5%). Gazprom would have been in charge of the section in Belarus.
7been discussed since the late nineties, but Russia's Western partners dragged their
feet due to high cost. In late 2005 the project took a surprising turn, when a
German{Russian consortium involving E.ON-Ruhrgas, Wintershall, and Gazprom
announced the construction of a twin pipeline, later named Nord Stream, with a
capacity of 60 bcm/a. Preparations for the onshore connection on the Russian side
started soon after the announcement, though progress on the essential o®shore part
was slow. The Baltic states and Poland mustered their in°uence in the EU to lobby
against the project and Nord Stream became one of the major obstacles for the
development of a common EU energy policy.
In principle, Belarus can also be bypassed onshore through Latvia and Lithuania.
We will refer to this option as Baltic. Such a pipeline could use existing capacities of
Yamal 1 in Poland and Russia without involving Belarus. With additional capacities
in Poland and Russia, it could also be part of a revised Yamal 2 project.9
We conclude the section with a number of observations. First, in marked contrast
to the EU-members Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, the non-EU-members
Belarus and Ukraine failed to ¯nd a stable long-term solution for their gas relations
with Russia. Instead they engaged in continuous bargaining over prices and tran-
sit fees. Second, in spite of sharp con°icts, interruptions of supply have been rare
and, with one notable exception, short lived. In a sense, instantaneous cooperation
was largely successful, but attempts to settle for a lasting division of surplus failed.
Third, in order to gain leverage over transit countries, Russia has pushed various
projects, such as Yamal, Bypass and lately Nord Stream. While the cost of estab-
lishing alternative supply routes are well known, the strategic gains are di±cult to
discern, even by order of magnitude. In the next section we develop a formal model
of how network architecture and investment options determine the power of the
di®erent players and the sharing of pro¯ts from gas exports.
9So far, this possibility has attracted little public attention. Only recently, in their attempts to
stall progress on Nord Stream, the EU members Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia proposed
a similar pipeline, called Amber, which would also pass through Estonia.
83 The Model
The Analytical Approach
We represent the interdependencies among the players by a game in value function
form (N;v), where N denotes the set of players and the value (or characteristic)
function v : 2jNj ! R+ gives the payo®, which a subset of players S µ N can achieve.
The value function captures the essential economic and institutional features, such
as the geography of the network, di®erent cost of alternative pipelines, demand for
gas, production cost, etc. A potential di±culty with the value function approach is
that a coalition's payo® may depend on what outside players do. Fortunately, this
problem does not arise in our setting, because one player, Russia, is essential in the
game. Coalitions, which do not include Russia, cannot form a complete supply chain
and, therefore, neither receive any income from exporting gas nor compete with the
coalition which includes Russia.
As mentioned in the introduction, we will consider di®erent value functions to re°ect
various assumptions about the scope of the game. In the `status quo' game (N;vs)
existing capacities cannot be changed. The value vs of a coalition depends on its
command over existing pipelines. In the `all options' scenario (N;va) a coalition
may invest in new pipelines to maximize the net-present value of its pro¯ts. Hence
the value va re°ects investment options, the di®erences in investment cost of various
pipelines, capital cost etc. However, we assume that the decision to invest in new
capacities becomes e®ective without delay | as if, investment options were ready
for execution at any time. Finally, we consider the general game (N; ¹ v), which also
accounts for inertia resulting from delay in implementation. We consider a stationary
environment with respect to technology, demand, etc, so that optimal investment
is independent of the delay.10 With this simpli¯cation we can approximate ¹ v as a
weighted average of vs and va. Suppose, it takes ¿ periods before investment can be
realized and new capacities become available, which then last forever. During the
¯rst ¿ periods the coalition's payo® will be given by vs and thereafter by va. For
a given discount rate r, we calculate the annuity ¹ v from the present value of this
10Delay is not the same as the time it takes to build a pipeline. Inertia may encompass many other
conditions. For example, the decision to built Nord Stream was taken end of 2005, but political
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Rearranging we obtain the value function as a weighted average:
¹ v = (1 ¡ ®)vs + ®va; ® = (1 + r)¡¿: (1)
As ¿ approaches in¯nity, inertia becomes overwhelming and we approach the status
quo game. As ¿ approaches zero, inertia disappears and we obtain the all option
game. Alternatively, for a given delay, the more forward looking and patient the
players are, the smaller will be r, and the more weight will be put on the options.11
Cooperative game theory has developed a number of solutions for games in value
function form. In the following we emphasize the Shapley value, Ái, i 2 N, which is




P(S)[v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S)] (2)
where P(S) = jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!=jNj! is the probability of coalition S. The Shapley
value is the only e±cient allocation of surplus featuring symmetry, the dummy player
property, and linearity (Shapley (1953)).12 Moreover, it is the unique rule with so
called balanced contributions: For any two players i and j it is true that i loses as
much if j withdrew from the game, as j loses if i withdrew. Hence, if a player objects
the Shapley allocation by pointing out the damage he can impose on another player
through a boycott of cooperation, his opponent can always counter the argument
(Myerson (1980)).
The Shapley value is also supported as the equilibrium of a number of non{
cooperative models of structured bargaining processes (the so called `Nash-
program'). Stole & Zwiebel (1996a) and Stole & Zwiebel (1996b) analyze a scenario,
which captures structural features of bargaining in the Eurasian gas network partic-
ularly well. They show that the Shapley value is the unique equilibrium outcome of a
non-cooperative bargain game, if an essential player negotiates bilateral agreements
11This interpretation implies that players may use di®erent discount rates when assessing power
structures and investment projects. We keep the cost of capital used to derive optimal investment
constant.
12Linearity ensures that Á(¹ v) = (1¡®)Á(v
s)+®Á(v
a), i.e. it allows us to calculate the solution of
the general game as a weighted average of the two extremes. Linearity and dummy player property
can be replaced with monotonicity (Young (1985a)).
10with the others players, which can be renegotiated before any plans are executed.13
In our case Russia is an essential player, without whom nothing can be achieved and
negotiations with transit countries are usually bilateral. As a rule, there are many
rounds of negotiations, resulting in letters of intent, preliminary agreements, etc.,
which will be renegotiated several times before investments and payments are made.
Besides the Shapley value we consider two alternative solutions: the core, which
is motivated by the stability of cooperation, and the nucleolus, which emphasizes
equality among coalitions. Let Ã with
P
i2N Ãi = v(N) denote a vector of feasible
and e±cient payo®s (an imputation), and °(S;Ã) =
P
i2S Ãi ¡ v(S) be the surplus
which a coalition receives in excess of its value. The core is given by the set of
allocations, which leave no coalition with a negative surplus Ãc = fÃ : °(S;Ã) ¸
0;8S µ Ng. Hence no coalition can possibly make all its members better o® by
withdrawing from cooperation with the other players. The nucleolus Ãn maximizes
the surplus of those coalitions, whose gains are smallest using a lexicographic order
(Schmeidler (1969)).14 If the core is empty, hence all feasible Ã impose a loss on at
least one coalition, the nucleolus minimizes the discontent of the coalitions, which
lose most. If the core is not empty, the nucleolus selects an allocation from the core,
which can be considered to be the most "equitable" in terms of coalitions' surplus.15
Calibration
In the following we outline the main steps of the calibration. Details are given in
the appendix. Since our focus is on the power structure within the supply chain for
Russian gas, we abstract from strategic interaction between Russia and competing
suppliers (e.g. Norway, Algeria) or large importers. The main players are Russia,
Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus. In addition, we include Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia, which are involved in attempts to bypass Ukraine or Belarus. Using capital
initials of the countries, the set of players is N = fR;U;P;B;S;La;Lig. As to
pipelines, we consider the old system through Ukraine, which we will refer to as
13For other non{cooperative foundations of the Shapley value see Gul (1989), Evans (1996)), and
Inderst & Wey (2001).
14Schmeidler (1969) de¯nes the nucleolus using the so called excess function e, that is the gain
which a coalition can assure by vetoing Ã, hence e = ¡°.
15In general, neither the core nor the nucleolus are monotonic (or linear) in the value (Young
(1985a)). However, when calibrating the model, we obtain the special case of a `Big Boss Game'
(Muto et. al. (1988)), for which both solutions are linear.
11South, the possibility to upgrade and extend it (referred to as Upgrade), the Ya-
mal 1 pipeline and its possible extension Yamal 2, Bypass, Baltic, and ¯nally Nord
Stream.16
Besides geography, a coalition's command over resources also re°ects institutional
features. For this reason, we will not consider the sections of the southern system,
which are located in Slovakia and Czech Republic. In these countries transit pipelines
have been sold to Western gas importers, whose property rights are constitutionally
protected. The situation is similar in Poland. The country cannot obstruct the use
of the existing pipeline Yamal 1. Long term agreements and constitutional rights
e®ectively assure Russia's access.17 However, we assume that all countries can veto
any new pipeline on their territory. Hence, without Poland neither Baltic nor Yamal
2 can be built. Without Slovakia the Bypass is unfeasible.
All pipeline options establish a complete link between Russia and its customers, but
there are important di®erences in transportation cost. We estimate transportation
cost for each link and obtain a simple hierarchy. By far the cheapest are Yamal 1
with a capacity of 28 bcm/a and South with app. 70 bcm/a, for which investment
cost are sunk. Up to a limit of about 15 bcm/a, the cheapest option for creating
new capacities is the modernization of the southern system, Upgrade. Beyond that
threshold Yamal 2 comes second, with capital cost, which are at least two times
larger. Here investment would bene¯t from preparations made during the construc-
tion of Yamal 1. Building new pipelines along the southern track, that is extending
Upgrade beyond 15 bcm/a, is slightly more expensive than Yamal 2. By far the
most expensive option is Nord Stream, which requires at least another doubling of
capital expenditures per unit of capacity. Bypass and Baltic are special cases. Up to
a capacity of 70 bcm/a Bypass costs about 20 percent less than Yamal 2, but only
if South is not used. Similarly, up to 28 bcm/a Baltic is about 40 percent cheaper
than Yamal 2 provided that Yamal 1 is not used. Beyond that threshold the costs
are comparable to those of Yamal 2.
Finally, we have to make assumptions on demand for Russian gas in `North-Western
Europe' and the cost of producing gas and transporting it to Russia's Western bor-
16We do not consider the recently proposed Amber pipeline because it is not cheaper than Baltic
and involves an additional player, Estonia. The added complexity would not change our results.
17It worth noting that in 2007, Polish courts protected Russian Gazprom against attempts by
the owner of the Polish section EuroPolGas (in which Gazprom has a 48% stake) to increase transit
rates by a meager 2%.
12der. For simplicity, we take linear speci¯cations for demand and marginal cost of
supply and make assumptions for the slope and intercept parameters, which capture
the situation in the ¯rst years of the new century (for details see the appendix).
Most importantly, the parameters have been chosen so that the grand coalition
would maximize its pro¯t by using existing capacities at South and Yamal 1 while
abstaining from investments in new capacities. Only sub-coalitions, which are re-
stricted in their access to existing pipelines, may want to increase capacities along
the tracks, which are under their control.
The main results of the calibration are reported in table 1. The ¯rst column shows
the smallest coalition necessary to implement the transport network characterized
in the next seven columns. The ¯gures indicate for all pipelines available capacity
and optimal investment: "-" means that the link is not available to the coalition,
by virtue of geography, as in the upper part of the table, or by assumption, as
in the lower part; "0" indicates that a link is available, but the coalition chooses
not to install capacities. Positive ¯gures indicate usage of existing or investment
in new capacities. The last column shows the resulting payo®, or value, of the
coalition expressed in per cent of the pro¯t of the grand coalition. We focus on
relative payo®s, because they re°ect geography and di®erences in transportation
cost, whereas absolute ¯gures are sensitive to our assumptions on demand and cost
of production.18
On its own, Russia would choose Nord Stream, the only option for which it does not
need partners, and install a capacity of 72 bcm/a. This would give Russia an annual
payo® equivalent to 57% of the pro¯t of the grand coalition. Russia and Ukraine
together forego investment in Nord Stream and invest in Upgrade, the renovation of
the existing system South instead. By avoiding the large cost of Nord Stream this
coalition would achieve a relative payo® of 96%. Given that Russia's access to the
Polish section of Yamal 1 is secured, the coalition of Russia and Belarus would use
the existing 28 bcm/a of Yamal 1 and install a capacity of 45 bcm/a at Nord Stream,
thereby earning a relative value of 72%. If Poland joined that coalition, investment
would shift to Yamal 2, with a capacity of 60 bcm/a, yielding a payo® of 89%. The
coalition of the three major players, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus would achieve the
value of the grand coalition simply by using the existing capacities.
18Most coalitions, not reported in table 1, either have equivalent investment opportunities, hence
equal payo®s, or they cannot establish a complete supply link and have zero pro¯t.
13Table 1: Coalitions, Capacities, and Value
coalition capacity on links [bcm/a] value
South Yamal 1 Bypass Nord %
Upgrade Yamal 2 Baltic Stream
all options (v
a)
R - - - - - - 72 57
R, U 70 15 - - - - 0 96
R, B - - 28 - - - 45 72
R, B, P - - 28 60 - - 0 89
R, B, U 70 0 28 - - - 0 100
R, B, P, S - - 28 0 60 - 0 92
R, P, Li, La - - - - - 88 0 85
all players 70 0 28 0 0 0 0 100
status quo (v
s)
R, U 70 - - - - - - 92
R, B - - 28 - - - - 51
R: Russia, B: Belarus, P: Poland, U: Ukraine, S: Slovakia, La: Latvia, Li: Lithuania
Bypass would enable Belarus, Poland, and Slovakia to replace the most important
transit country, Ukraine, using existing capacities through Slovakia and Czech Re-
public. By including Slovakia, the coalition fR;B;Pg could increase its worth by 4
percentage points to 93%. The di®erence is modest, but it requires only one addi-
tional player. The link through the Baltic countries Latvia and Lithuania consists
of two parts: a short pipeline with a capacity of 28 bcm/a, which replaces Belarus
in using Yamal 1, and a second one with another 60 bcm/a, which is a variant of
Yamal 2. These investments would enable the coalition fR;P;Li;Lag to achieve a
payo® of 85%. Compared to what Russia can achieve alone, this is an increase by
28 points. The di®erence is large, but it takes three additional players to achieve it.
4 The Power Structure
In table 2 we present the players' relative power, calculated from their Shapley values
for various assumptions on the scope of the game. We will refer to the ¯gures as
shares of pro¯t (in percent), or simply as power index. In the left column of the upper
part, under the heading `status quo', we report the results for the case, in which the
existing network cannot be changed. In this situation Russia completely depends on
14Table 2: Relative Shapley Value [%]
status adding one option at a time
quo
a Upgrade Yamal 2 Bypass Baltic North
Russia 57.1 57.8 60.3 59.2 58.7 79.7
Ukraine 31.8 32.5 22.2 23.5 29.1 15.1
Belarus 11.1 9.6 14.3 13.2 7.5 5.2
Poland 0 0 3.2 2.1 1.6 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 2.1 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 1.6 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 1.6 0
all excluding one option at a time general
options Upgrade Yamal 2 Bypass Baltic North game
Russia 82.4 81.9 81.9 82.3 82.0 62.6 74.5
Ukraine 10.1 9.5 10.9 10.7 11.0 19.5 16.8
Belarus 4.3 5.0 3.7 4.1 5.3 10.1 6.5
Poland 2.0 2.2 1.5 1.9 1.6 4.8 1.4
Slovakia 0.2 0.2 1.0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Lithuania 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0 1.4 0.3
Latvia 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0 1.4 0.3
aCapacities are 70 bcm/a at South and 28 at Yamal 1, which are optimal given our as-
sumptions on transportation cost, demand, and production cost. Figures do not add up due
to rounding errors.
Belarus and Ukraine for transit.19 The two countries compete for transport service,
but as capacities are limited, the competition is weak. With 57%, Russia's share is
just 7 points above what it would obtain if facing a monopolistic transit country.
The unequal shares of Ukraine and Belarus, 32% and 11% respectively, re°ect the
di®erences in capacities at South and Yamal 1.
If we take into account the various possibilities to change the transport grid, the
picture changes dramatically. The results for the `all options' game are in the lower
part of table 2. With more than 82%, Russia now obtains the lion's share of the
pro¯t. Recall, that, given our assumption on demand and supply, none of the
additional investment options would be used. It is the mere possibility to build
19By assumption Poland cannot obstruct the use of Yamal 1, hence, it cannot derive any power
from threatening to do so. Our model does not account for the share Poland has secured in
negotiations before this pipeline was build.
15pipelines through the Baltic Sea, to increase capacities on Yamal and on South,
and to bypass Ukraine and Belarus, that increases Russia's share by more than
a quarter of the total payo®. Ukraine's share is slashed by two thirds, from 32%
down to 10%. With a loss of almost 7 points Belarus is also hard hit. Poland, in
contrast, is strengthened and receives a share of 2%. Latvia and Lithuania as well as
Slovakia derive their power from making it possible to bypass Belarus and Ukraine,
respectively. Their payo®s are tiny compared to those of the established transit
countries. However, given their much smaller population, the bene¯ts are still very
substantial. If measured in per capita terms, the bene¯ts of Lithuania and Latvia
fall in between those of Poland and Ukraine.
To single out the strategic value of particular options, we look at them in isolation,
adding one link at a time to the `status quo' (see upper part of table 2). Alternatively,
we evaluate them in the context of the other options, withdrawing one link at a time
from the benchmark case `all options' (see lower part of table 2). For small additions
to the capacity, Upgrade is the cheapest option, but its impact on the power structure
is small, whether it is evaluated alone or on the background of all other options,
because the existing capacities at South are already large. If Yamal 2 were the only
possibility to increase capacity, its strategic impact would be substantial. It would
cut Ukraine's share by more than 9 points, almost a third of the share in `status
quo'. If seen in the context of the other options, however, Yamal 2 is of modest
relevance. Comparison of the third and the ¯rst columns in the lower part of table
2 shows that Russia, Belarus, and Poland each gains half a percentage point, while
Ukraine and Slovakia lose. Slovakia's loss indicates that the strategic value of Yamal
2 is related to Bypass, the only pipeline which involves this country. Like Yamal
2, Bypass looks important only in isolation. Assessed in the context of all other
options, its impact on Russia is negligible and Slovakia gains little. This is due to
the fact that all coalitions, which can realize Bypass, can also realize Yamal 2, which
is just marginally less pro¯table. Nord Stream, though the most expensive option,
has the strongest impact on the power structure. In isolation, it raises Russia's
index from 57% to almost 80%. Even when assessed on the background of all other
options, Nord Stream pushes Russia's share from nearly 63% up to more than 82%.
Hence, the direct access is more important than all other options together.
How do geography and cost interact in determining bargaining power? To develop
the intuition, we focus on the four main countries, Russia, Belarus, Poland and
16Ukraine. Suppose that all pipelines had equal cost, so that total pro¯t would be
the same, whatever connection is used. If the only possible transport route were
through Ukraine, then Russia and Ukraine would share 1=2 : 1=2. If we add an
equally e±cient route through Belarus and Poland, Russia would obtain 7=12 of the
pro¯t, Ukraine 1=4, and Belarus and Poland would share the rest equally, obtaining
1=12 each.20 Ukraine su®ers a lot from the competing route, but Russia has to share
the gain with the two transit countries. Finally, if we allow Russia to establish a
direct o®shore link on its own, it can capture the whole pro¯t, as there is no need
to cooperate with anyone.
Now, assume that all options are available, but pipelines di®er in their cost, ei-
ther because of di®erent conditions (o®shore vs. onshore) or because investment
costs are already sunk. Loosely speaking, Russia would start with the pro¯t,
obtained if the expensive direct link were the only possible connection to West-
ern Europe. While Nord Stream looks ine±cient in comparison to the other op-
tions, standing alone, it would be a highly pro¯table project. Given our cali-
bration, it already yields 57% of the pro¯t of the most e±cient transportation
network. In addition, Russia receives 7=12 of the increase in pro¯t obtained by
switching from the o®shore to the cheaper onshore option, Yamal. Finally, Rus-
sia would enjoy 1/2 of the increment achieved by using the most e±cient solu-




a share of 81% when evaluated using the ¯gures from table 1. This result is close to
the ¯gure from the more complex model reported in table 2. Enriching the analy-
sis with more players and pipeline options makes the model more realistic, but the
quantitative results change only marginally.
Finally, we consider the role of inertia and impatience. Being linear in the value
function, the Shapley value of the general game it is easily computed using the
weights from equation (1). It may take from two to six years from the decision to
invest until capacities become available. Unfortunately, we have little clues as to
the discount rates countries use to evaluate international negotiations, but a range
of 5 % to 15 % should be a reasonable guess. We use four years and 10 % for our
baseline case, reported in in the last column of the lower panel of table 2. Not
20With payo®s normalized to one, the value function would be: v(fR;B;Pg) = v(fR;Ug) =
v(fR;P;Ug) = v(fR;B;Ug) = v(fR;B;P;Ug) = 1 and zero in all other cases, yielding Shapley
values of ÁR = 7=12, ÁB = ÁP = 1=12, and ÁU = 1=4.
17surprisingly, delay reduces Russia's power index and increases the power of those
countries, which can disrupt the °ow in the existing network. We made a number of
robustness tests, some of which are reported in the appendix. Overall the Shapley
values are reasonably robust with respect to our assumptions on demand and cost.
However, given the large discrepancy between the power indices for status quo and
the all options games, somewhat speculative assumptions on delay in the exercise
of options and the discount rate applied in international negotiations have a strong
impact on the results.
Other Solutions: Core and Nucleolus
Our calibration simpli¯es the calculation of the core and the nucleolus considerably.
The geography of the transport network (¯gure 1) implies that some transit countries
are complementary, eg. Poland and Belarus with respect to Yamal, while others are
substitutes, e.g. Belarus and Ukraine with pipelines Yamal and South, respectively.
Hence, the joint contribution v(S) ¡ v(SnM) of a subset transit countries M to a
coalition S, may be smaller (complements) or larger (substitutes) than the sum of
their individual contributions
P
i2M(v(S)¡v(Snfig)). However, with our calibration
Poland's contribution to the grand coalition N is zero: (i) it cannot obstruct the
use of the existing capacities at Yamal 1 for institutional reasons, and (ii) the grand
coalition would not like to invest in Yamal 2 for lack of demand. As a result, the joint
contribution of Poland and Belarus equals Belarus' contribution, which makes them
weak substitutes with respect to the grand coalition. By similar reasoning it can be
shown that v(N)¡v(NnM) ¸
P
i2M(v(N)¡v(Nnfig)) forall M µ NnfRg, so that
the games (N;vs), (N;va) are `Big Boss Games' as de¯ned in Muto et. al. (1988).
For this class of games, both solutions are linear in the value. More speci¯cally, the
nucleolus is in the very center of the core and gives every non-essential player exactly
half of his marginal contribution to the Grand coalition Ãn
i = (v(N)¡v(Nnfig))=2.
How does the Shapley value compares to other possible solutions? In table 3 we
report the range of possible values in the core, Ãc, the nucleolus Ãn, and, for ease
of comparison, again the Shapley value Á for all three games. Both, the nucleolus
and the core will allocate all the power to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and none
to any other players. The core and the nucleolus depend on the values of the
coalitions fR;Ug and fR;B;P;Sg.21 Neither coalition would invest in Nord Stream
21We brie°y explain the steps for the all option game, (v
a;N). Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine
18Table 3: Core Ãc, Nucleolus Ãn, and Shapley Value Á









Russia 43 -100 71.5 57 88 -100 94 82 75 -100 87.5 74.5
Ukraine 0 - 49 24.5 32 0 - 8 4 10 0 - 20 10 16.8
Belarus 0 - 8 4 11 0 - 4 2 4 0 - 5 2.5 6.5
Poland 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2 0 - 0 0 1.4
others 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0.8
vs(fR; Ug) = 92 va(fR; Ug) = 96 ¹ v(fR; Ug) ¼ 95
vs(fR; Bg) = 51 va(fR; B; P; Sg) = 92 ¹ v(fR; B; P; Sg) ¼ 80
or Yamal 2 (see table 1). As a result these two pipelines would be strategically
irrelevant if bargaining power were determined by the core or the nucleolus. Since
fR;Ug invests in Upgrade and fR;B;P;Sg in Bypass, exactly those options, which
carry little strategic weight under the Shapley value, turn out to be decisive for the
nucleolus and the core.
For all three solutions there is a consistent pattern across games. As we move from
status quo to all options, Russia's share increases, while those of Ukraine and Belarus
decline. But the focus on di®erent coalitions and their options has a large impact
for the predicted power index. The essential player Russia appears much stronger
when assessed with the nucleolus. In the general game, the di®erence between the
together can achieve the full payo®, v(fR;B;Ug) = 100, while the others achieve nothing, v(S) = 0




i = 0 for i 2 NnfR;B;Ug. Second, from v(fR;Ug) = 96, we
obtain the maximum, which the core can possibly assign to Belarus, Ã
c
B · 4. The nucleolus splits
this gain evenly among the coalitions fR;Ug and fBg, hence Ã
n
B = 2. Third, from v(fR;B;P;Sg) =
92, the highest value for a coalition not including Ukraine, we obtain Ã
c
U · 8. Again, by even split
Ukraine receives Ã
n
U = 4, which leaves Russia with Ã
n
R = 94. The nucleolus of the game (v
a;N)






1: °(fR;B;Ug) = °(fPg) = °(fSg) = °(fLig) = °(fLag) = 0;
2: °(fR;Ug) = °(fBg) = 2; 3: °(fR;B;P;Sg) = °(fUg) = 4; 4: °(fB;Ug) = 6;
5: °(fR;B;Pg) = 7; 6: °(fR;P;Li;Lag) = 9; 7: °(fRg) = 37
Finally, if the whole pro¯t is allocated to Russia, no subset of players can veto this allocation,
because Russia is an essential player in this game, hence, Ã
c
R 2 [88;100].
19nucleolus (or the center of the core) and the Shapley value is almost 13 points and
of a similar magnitude in the other games. Russia's strength is mirrored by the
weakness of Belarus and Ukraine, whose power indices are reduced from 6.5 and
16.8, respectively, when assessed with the Shapley value down to 2.5 and 10, when
assessed with the nucleolus.
5 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical analysis of the previous section revealed that the analysis of the
power structure depends critically on (i) how we account for investment options
and the delay in their implementation and (ii) the choice of the solution concept
(nucleolus, core, and Shapley value). Compared to these determinants, assumptions
on the parameters of demand, cost etc. are of minor importance. In this section we
make an attempt to provide empirical evidence on these issues. In particular we
ask: (i) whether the empirical power structure is mainly derived from the control of
existing pipelines or whether it also re°ects options to change the system, and (ii)
which solution gives a better prediction.
We start by estimating how the countries shared the gains from gas exports in real
world bargaining around 2001/2. For practical reasons we con¯ne the analysis to
the most important transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. This evidence is then
contrasted with the theoretical predictions. Unfortunately, empirical evidence in a
strict sense would require observations from a world with and a world without gas
exports to Western Europe. As we have only the former, our empirical evidence
depends on assumptions about counterfactuals, some of which involve a substantial
degree of judgement.
We base our assessment only on measurable economic bene¯ts. This approach would
be misleading, if Russia pursued political goals by granting favorable gas deals. In
our opinion, this is not very likely for the time and the countries in question. By
2001/2, the Putin administration had adopted a rather sober and commercial atti-
tude towards the major transit countries (for similar views see Stern (2005), Bruce
(2005)). Previous attempts to pull the neighbors closer, either in the framework of
CIS or bilaterally, had failed to yield discernible results. In particular, several plans
to establish a monetary or even political union with Belarus never went beyond the
stage of declarations. There was also little move in the opposite direction. Neither
20the Lukashenko regime in Minsk nor the Kuchma government in Kiev showed am-
bitions towards closer cooperation with EU or NATO, what might have produced
concerns in Moscow. Thus, for the ¯rst years of the decade we do not see the kind of
political concessions on the part of Belarus or Ukraine, which could have motivated
Russia to forego substantial economic bene¯ts.
Data and Estimation
We consider two types of economic bene¯ts, which the transit countries obtain from
their strategic position in the transport network: explicit payments for transit ser-
vices either in cash or barter, and price discounts for the transit countries' own
gas imports. As described in section 2, negotiations about import prices have al-
ways been intermingled with transit issues. Price discounts, which are related to
the strategic position in the gas network have to be added to direct transit fees
to obtain a comprehensive measure of bene¯ts. In order to quantify the value of
price discounts, we have to chose an appropriate benchmark price, the import price
for gas, which would be paid in the absence of gas transit. To calculate a power
index all bene¯ts have to be measured on a common scale. Since the gas, which
Ukraine receives explicitly for its transit service is by far the largest single item
in our calculation, it is convenient to convert all ¯gures into gas equivalents at
the assumed benchmark price. Formally we calculate a transit country's share as
(Fi+Di)=(Ti+FU +DU +FB +DB ¡C), i 2 fU;Bg, with F: transit fee, D: bene¯t
from price discount, T: relevant total transit volume, C: cost, and the subscripts
referring to Ukraine and Belarus, respectively. We base our estimation on the transit
and gas agreements of the years 2001 and 2002 and the subsequent developments,
which are documented in Bruce (2005), and Stern (2005).22
Explicit compensations. Following the agreement of 2001 Ukraine received
an average 25 bcm/a of gas as an explicit compensation for its transit service dur-
ing 2001-2005. For Belarus the intergovernmental agreement of 2002 set a fee of
22The agreements contain debt settlements, which originate from payment arrears carried over
from the nineties. They also include provisions for strengthening Gazprom's control over pipelines
in the transit countries, which failed to materialize afterwards. We ignore both aspects in our
evaluation.
21$ 0.46 per tcm/100km for transit to Western Europe through Yamal and $ 0.53
per tcm/100km for transit to Poland through Northern Lights (Ya¯mava & Stern
(2007)). From export volumes of 18 bcm/a and 8 bcm/a and a distance of 575
km, we estimate the annual revenue of Belarus at app. $ 72 mln/a, which will be
converted to gas equivalents below.
Price discounts. As to the appropriate benchmark price we consider two vari-
ants. The lower bound is given by the price, which Itera and other independent
suppliers charged in 2001 for deliveries to CIS countries, approximately 40 $/tcm.
Arguably, this benchmark is too low, because gas from independent Russian com-
panies or central Asia used to be cheaper, exactly because Gazprom prevented it
from being sold anywhere except to selected CIS countries. We use 60 $/tcm as
an upper bound for the benchmark price in 2001. We do not consider European
prices as a relevant benchmark, as these are indexed prices for gas delivered under
long term contracts and re°ect to a large extent the recent hikes in oil prices. It is
unlikely that Ukraine and Belarus had settled for European prices in the absence of
gas exports. For example Latvia and Lithuania paid Gazprom around 50 $/tcm in
late 2001, more than Ukraine and Belarus, but a far cry from European prices of
100 { 120 $/tcm.
The agreement of the year 2001 entitled Ukraine to 30 bcm/a of gas shipments
through Russian pipelines in excess to those which where used as a transit fee.
Since Russia o±cially insisted on Western prices for its own gas, Ukraine attempted
to secure supplies from central Asia, mainly Turkmenistan | paying prices around
40 $/tcm.23 For the low benchmark we ¯nd no price discount for Ukraine. However,
for the upper benchmark of 60 $/tcm we obtain a cash bene¯t worth $ 600 mln/a
(20 $/tcm £ 30 bcm/a), which converts into a gas equivalent of 10 bcm/a.
For Belarus the agreement of 2002 stated that it would receive 10.3 bcm/a at Rus-
sia's internal price. Standing at app. 24 $/tcm, the internal price implied a very
substantial discount compared to the price of independent suppliers.24 Even for the
23Unfortunately, we cannot reconstruct the exact amounts and prices from the meager information
on these deals. Apparently, Russia continued to deliver gas even when Ukraine failed to secure
su±cient quantities in direct deals, without receiving European prices for these shipments. In the
end, Ukraine obtained about 30 bcm/a paying approximately the lower benchmark price (for details
see Stern (2005) and Stern (2006)).
24In the following Russia's internal prices steadily increased, but the prices of independent sup-
22Table 4: Estimated Sharing of Pro¯t in 2001/2
explicit compensation for transit only including discounts on imported gas
low price high price low price high price
absolute bene¯ts in gas equivalents [bcm/a]
Ukraine 25.0 25.0 25.0 35.0
Belarus 1.8 1.2 5.9 7.4
relative shares in total gas volume [%]
a
not accounting for cost
Ukraine 13.9 14.0 13.6 17.9
Belarus 1.4 1.0 4.5 5.2
medium cost (worth 1/5 of the gas)
Ukraine 17.4 17.5 17.0 22.4
Belarus 1.8 1.2 5.7 6.5
high cost (worth 1/3 of the gas)
Ukraine 20.9 21.0 20.4 26.9
Belarus 2.1 1.4 6.8 7.8
aThe total volume is obtained by adding the gas equivalent of the bene¯ts to the base
quantity, which is 153 bcm/a in case of Ukraine and 100 bcm/a in case of Belarus.
low benchmark the bene¯t was worth a gas equivalent of 4.1 bcm/a, which has to
be added to the 1.8 bcm/a gas equivalent of direct transit fees ($ 72 mln/a). For
the high benchmark price of 60$/tcm the equivalent of the price discount increases
to 6.2 bcm/a but we obtain a lower gas equivalent of 1.2 bcm/a for cash transit fees.
The results are given in the upper part of table 4.
Shares. As the next step we relate the bene¯ts to the total amount of gas, which
is composed of gas exports and gas used to compensate for transit. During 2001-
2005 the average volume of total transit through Belarus and Ukraine amounted
to 153 bcm/a (Stern (2005), p. 86). This ¯gure includes transits to Eastern and
Southern Europe and is larger than exports to the Northwest of Europe on which
the theoretical model is built. Since we cannot separate the compensation, which
Ukraine received for transit to countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, we have to use
this ¯gure as a basis for comparison. For Belarus, however, we use only exports to
pliers rose even faster. So by 2003 the ¯gures were closer to 30 $/tcm and 50 $/tcm, respectively
(Stern (2005)).
23Western Europe including Poland, app. 100 bcm/a. In both cases we add the gas
equivalent of the bene¯ts to obtain the overall amount of gas to be shared. Note
that the latter depends on the benchmark price used for converting cash bene¯ts
into gas equivalents.
As the last step, we account for the cost of supplying gas to Europe, which are borne
by Russia only. A fraction of the gas is used in compressor stations. Depending on
the distance and the pipelines the loss will range from 10% to 15% of the gas supplied.
Measuring and converting other operating cost into gas equivalents is di±cult. Again
we make a bold assumption and consider two variants with gas equivalents of one
¯fth and one third. The results are given in the lower part of table 4.
The estimation of surplus sharing from empirical data involves as much judgement
as the calibration of the theoretical model. As the benchmark price or Russia's
cost increases, the estimated shares of the two major transit countries increase. We
choose the medium cost variant as our most reasonable guess. That leaves us with an
estimated share for Ukraine in the range of 17.0 { 22.4, depending on the benchmark
price. For Belarus we obtain a range of 5.7 { 6.5, of which less than one third can
be attributed to direct transit fees and the rest to price discounts.
Comparison with Theoretical Results
To facilitate the argument we illustrate the power indices in ¯gure 2. The lightly
shaded areas indicate the maximal range of our empirical estimates. The lower
bounds are obtained from the zero cost / low price scenario from table 4 and the
upper bounds from the high cost / high price scenario. The darkly shaded areas
indicate what we consider as our most reasonable empirical estimate.
First, we compare the empirical results with the range spanned by the Shapley
values of the all-options and the status-quo game, Á(va) and Á(vs), respectively. For
Ukraine, these are 10.1 and 31.8 (see table 2). As can be seen from ¯gure 2 (or by
comparison with table 4), our empirical estimates fall within the boundaries. Even
the upper bound of the empirical estimation is smaller than what Ukraine could
expect under status quo bargaining. On the other side, even the smallest ¯gure in
the empirical range is larger than the Shapley value of the all option game. This
observation leads us to the conclusion that options do matter, but so does inertia. In
case of Belarus the Shapley indices are 4.3 and 11.1. Again, our empirical estimations









in the range of 5.7 { 6.5 are well within the limits.
Second, we ask whether the Shapley value Á(¹ v) of the calibrated general game
matches the empirical estimates well. In the baseline variant (see table 2), the
Shapley indices were 6.5 and 16.8 for Belarus and Ukraine, respectively. As illus-
trated in ¯gure 2 both are well within the corresponding empirical ranges. However,
in case of Ukraine the theoretical prediction is just at the lower bound of the range,
which we consider as most plausible empirical estimate, while in case of Belarus it
is at the upper bound. Ukraine appears to be somewhat stronger in "real life" than
in our theoretical baseline model, while the opposite is true for Belarus.
We suggest two reasons for this minor divergence. The ¯rst is related to the calibra-
tion of the theoretical model. Here we assumed that Yamal 1 is available with its
planned capacity of 28 bcm/a. The pipeline went into operation in 1998 but due to
slow installment of compressors it reached full capacity only in 2006. In 2001/2002,
when the deals were made, from which we obtained our empirical estimates, the ca-
pacity was closer to 18{20 bcm/a. For this reason, our theoretical model is slightly
biased towards underestimating the power of Ukraine and overestimating the power
of Belarus. The second is related to our focus on exports to North-Western Europe.
This area can be reached by all pipeline options, which we took into considera-
tion, but it accounts only for two thirds of the total exports delivered through the
Ukrainian network. For destinations in central and South-Eastern Europe, such as
Hungary, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria it is more di±cult to avoid transit through
25Figure 3: Empirical Shares and Theoretical Predictions based on the Nucleolus










As can be seen from ¯gure 3, theoretical predictions based on the nucleolus tend
to underestimate the power of transit countries. In the case of Belarus, the whole
range spanned by the all options and the status quo game is below the lower bound
of our empirical values. For Ukraine, only the status quo game yields a prediction,
which matches empirical estimates well. In defense of the nucleolus one might argue
that the players in the Eurasian gas supply chain were guided by a short-term
assessment of bargaining power. The agreements of 2001/2 had be shaped by the
power to obstruct and divert °ows in the existing system. However, contrary to the
events some years later, there is no evidence that threats to cut °ows played a role in
the negotiations at that time. Quite to the contrary, the discussions clearly centered
on investment plans both for alternative pipelines and for improving existing ones.
In particular, shelving the plans for Bypass, was one of the concessions Russia made
to Ukraine.
Finally, we turn to the core to shed some light on the stability of cooperation. From
comparing the ¯gures from tables 3 and 4 follows that our empirical estimates are
somewhat large to be safely in the core of the general game. The core would allocate
a maximum of 20 to Ukraine and 5 to Belarus, which leaves a large part, in case of
Belarus even all, of our most reasonable range outside. This fact may explain, why
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus found it so di±cult to settle for a lasting long-term
solution of the gas transit issues in the past. The observed shares of Ukraine and
26Belarus are too large to be ¯rmly established in a stable long-term arrangement. At
the same time the whole range of empirical estimates is well within the core of the
status quo game, for which the upper limits are 49 and 8, for Ukraine and Belarus,
respectively. No coalition can unilaterally improve over the currently observed pro¯t
sharing by exploiting its short-term potential to obstruct °ows in the existing system.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we used cooperative game theory to develop and calibrate a model
of bargaining power in the supply chain for Russian gas. The power structure thus
obtained re°ects in an intuitive way the architecture of the current system, the cost
of various options for its extension, and the delays in bringing about a change. We
contrasted the theoretical results with empirical evidence obtained from transit and
import agreements for Ukraine and Belarus, and found that the Shapley value yields
better predictions than other solutions, such as core and nucleolus. Nevertheless,
the paper is only a ¯rst step towards the analysis of strategic issues in international
gas transport. We see three major limitations, which merit further investigation.
Calculating the value function, we assumed that coalitions use all pipeline options,
which do not cross the territory of outsiders, in order to maximize their joint pro¯t.
Given the sunk cost nature of pipeline investment, e±ciency within a coalition
requires that its members can make long-term commitments to grant access to
pipelines and share rents in a particular way. However, if international institutions
lack the power to enforce such contracts and if the country's legal system is weak,
a national players may lack the ability to credibly commit. In this case contracts
remain incomplete and recontracting will be anticipated. To account for contrac-
tual incompleteness, Hubert & Ikonnikova (2004) blend the cooperative approach
with non-cooperative elements in a two stage game. At the ¯rst stage, only those
players, who can credibly commit, form `strategic' coalitions, by agreeing on access
rights, long-term sharing of rents, and investments. These pre-coalitions cooperate
internally but act non-cooperatively with respect to outsiders. At the second stage
all players bargain over the sharing of rents in the framework of the access regime
inherited from the ¯rst stage. Hubert & Ikonnikova (2004) show that in the Rus-
sian gas network contractual incompleteness creates strong incentives to overinvest
in some expensive pipelines (e.g. Nord Stream) and underinvest in cheap pipelines
27(e.g. Upgrade).
The present paper accounts for inertia, i.e. the time it takes between the decision to
invest and new capacities becoming available, but we do not consider the possibility
to deliberately delay the decision itself. If contracts are incomplete, then coopera-
tion may be enhanced through dynamic strategies, which make future investment
dependent on past rent sharing (e.g. trigger or tit-for-tat). Hubert & Suleymanova
(2008) consider an in¯nite sequence of games, in which players, at any stage, share
the rents from previous investments and possibly invest in new capacities, which
become available with some delay. The non-cooperative one shot game replicates
Hubert & Ikonnikova (2004), players would share rents according to the status quo
game, and `strategic coalitions' invest to maximize discounted future rents. In the
collusive equilibrium, in contrast `strategic coalitions' delay ine±cient investments,
creating thereby a credible threat to do so later, while outsiders compromise on
their bargaining power under status quo. Hubert & Suleymanova (2008) show that
with repeated interaction there is substantial scope for cooperation (collusion) in
the network for Russian gas even if contracts are incomplete.
Finally, one should extend the geographical coverage of the analysis. Some smaller
amendments require only minor adoptions, e.g the onshore pipelines along the Black
Sea as well as their o®shore alternatives, Blue Stream and South Stream. Including
additional producers such as Turkmenistan and Iran, which are linked to pipeline
options such as the Tanscaspian Gas Pipeline or Nabucco, however, requires pro-
found changes in the analytical approach. With the possibility of competing supply
routes, the value of a coalition may depend on whether outside players form other
coalitions. To allow for externalities across coalitions, the game has to be described
by the partition function. None of the solutions considered in this paper, can be
directly applied to this format. For a ¯rst attempt to analyze such an extended net-
work see Ikonnikova (2007) who uses a generalization of the Shapley value proposed
by Maskin (2003) to solve the game.
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31A Calibration
The value of a coalition S is calculated as:
v(S) = max
fxiji2LSg




where LS denotes the pipeline options available to S, xi is the quantity delivered
through link i, x is total supply, Ti stands for link speci¯c transportation cost per
unit of gas, p is inverse demand for Russian gas, and C0 denotes production cost.
Transportation Cost
The total cost of transporting gas can be decomposed into capacity cost and operat-
ing cost, the latter consisting of management & maintenance cost and energy cost.
These items are estimated for every possible link separately, to obtain a realistic
picture of the di®erences in transportation cost.
Capacity Cost. For existing pipelines (South, Yamal 1) capacity cost are sunk
and can be ignored in the analysis. As to new projects, like Nord Stream and Yamal
2, there is considerable variation in published cost estimates, and for others, like
Baltic, there are no public ¯gures available.25 Therefore, we complement published
¯gures with our own estimates. Assumed cost for pipes, compressors, and track
preparation re°ect the situation in 2000.26 In all cases, we estimate the cost of
establishing the capacity for a complete link from a major node in the Russian
system to the border of Western Europe.
For new pipelines, the capacity cost are roughly proportional to distance, but there
are several types of economies of scale. Some are related to the pipeline itself,
others are gains obtained from laying pipelines along the same track. The capacity
of a pipeline increases in pipe diameter and the pressure it can withstand. Holding
pressure constant, the cost per unit of pipeline capacity decrease in pipe diameter.
Capacity economy of scale appears to fade out at a capacity of 20 bcm/year, though
25Public information on investment cost and prices is usually given in $ or € and sometimes it is
not clear to which exact date it refers. The calibration re°ect the situation at the beginning of the
new century. Between 1.1.1999 and 31.12.2001 the $ / € rate varied between 0.83 and 1.24 with an
average of 1:04 ¼ 1.
26We are grateful to engineers from Wintershall AG for helpful discussions about our approach
and cross checking of parameter assumptions.
32this e®ect is somewhat weaker with o®shore pipelines than with onshore pipes.27 For
simplicity we calculate cost for a large increase of capacity and assume the resulting
cost per unit to be constant over the relevant range. Since we obtain rather large
additional investments for coalitions, which would invest at all, this simpli¯cation
will be of little consequence. The terrain is another important determinant of cost
of new pipelines. Some costs of preparing the ground, building supply roads, etc.
can be avoided by using established tracks, which also allows for sharing backup
capacity of compressor power (track economics of scale). As new pipelines need
about three years for completion, we add 15% of investment cost for interest during
construction in these cases.
The ¯gures in the ¯rst column of table 5 show, that the capacity cost, thus obtained,
vary considerably between the di®erent investment options. For South and Yamal 1
capacity cost are sunk, other projects, such as Upgrade, Bypass, and Baltic have low
capacity cost because they can make use of complementary existing infrastructure.
The second column of table 5 shows the maximal capacity, for which the cost are
valid. As we express all ¯gures on an annual basis, we calculate annualized cost
of capacity from project speci¯c initial investment cost per capacity Ii as Ci =
r ¢ Ii=(1 ¡ (1 + r)¡T), where T = 25 denotes the expected lifetime of the facilities
and r = 0:15 is the assumed interest rate for investment in the gas industry. The
rate has to account for the real option nature of the investment and is in line with
hurdle rates which are applied in the industry for project evaluation.
Operating Cost. The costs of management & maintenance, mi are assumed to
be proportional to distance and quantity of gas. We assume mi = 0:1$=tcm=100km
for all pipelines, except the o®shore pipeline Nord Stream, for which we double the
¯gure. To keep the gas moving, a certain fraction g of it is used to power compressor
stations. We assume g = 0:25%=100km for all pipelines, except for South, with its
ine±cient old compressors, and Nord Stream, which needs much higher pressure for
its o®shore section. Both have g = 0:5%.
Total. With these assumptions link speci¯c transportation cost per unit (net of
production cost) are: Ti = (ci + mi + gi ¢ MC0)(egi¢li ¡ 1)=gi where li denotes the
length of the pipeline, ci = Ci=li is the capital cost divided by the total length of link
27For further information see Oil, Gas and Coal Supply Outlook (1994) and International Energy
Agency (1994).
33Table 5: Transport Links for Russian Gas
project capacity maximal length compressor management &
cost (Ci) capacity (li) gas (gi) maintenance (mi)
[$/tcm] [bcm/a] [100km] [%/100km] [$/tcm/100km]
South sunk 70 20 0.50 0.1
The old southern system of parallel pipelines, gas storages, compressors
in poor state of repair. Only accounting for capacities used for export
through Czech Republic to Western Europe. Higher energy cost due to
old compressors.
Upgrade 50 15 20 0.25 0.1
Repairs and replacement of old compressor stations using the existing
pipeline capacities of South.
102 1 20 0.25 0.1
Increasing capacity of South beyond modernization through new pipelines
and compressors.
Yamal 1 sunk 28 16 0.25 0.1
Pipeline from Torzok to Germany, operating since 1998.
Yamal 2 99 1 16 0.25 0.1
New pipeline parallel to Yamal 1 with some preparations already made.
Bypass 77 70 16 0.25 0.1
New pipeline from Torzok to Velke Kapusany, replacing South in the use
of capacities westward through Slovakia.
Baltic 58 28 16 0.25 0.1
New pipeline replacing the section of Yamal 1 in Belarus.
99 1 16 0.25 0.1
New pipeline from Torzok to Germany, like Yamal 2 but bypassing
Belarus.
Nord Stream 215 1 16 0.50 0.2
New pipeline from Greifswald (Germany) | Vyborg (Russia) 1200 km
o®shore, then 400 km onshore to Torzhok. Higher maintenance cost due
to large o®shore section, and higher energy cost due to higher pressure.
34i, and MC0 denotes the marginal cost of production. The latter a®ect transportation
cost because it determines the value of compressor gas.28
Demand & Production Cost
Unfortunately, we cannot base the calibration with respect to demand and produc-
tion cost on solid data. The bulk of Russian gas is delivered under a small number
of long-term `take-or-pay' contracts, the details of which are con¯dential. Published
information on import prices, which often di®er by a wide margin, largely re°ects
oil price movements on which contract prices are indexed. As a result there is little
information on the demand side. Current gas production depends on investment in
exploration, wells, and pipelines, which is sunk. The higher the output, the faster
established ¯elds deplete and the sooner new ¯elds have to be developed. Hence, the
resource cost of Russian gas depends on reserves in old ¯elds, the cost of developing
new ¯elds, and the relevant discount rates, all of which can be estimated only with a
considerable margin of error. Given this lack of reliable date, we base the calibration
of supply and demand on a number of bold assumptions.
For simplicity we assume demand and production cost to be linear and independent
of the transport route. The parameters of the functions have been chosen so that the
capacities at South and Yamal 1 are su±cient to maximize the pro¯ts of the grand
coalition N, given our cost for additional pipeline capacities. At the beginning of
the decade, most observers expected a steady increase in demand, but Yamal 1 was
built slowly up to its planned level of 28 bcm/a because capacity was slightly ahead
of demand. British Petroleum (2006) reports an average of 125 $/tcm for the prices
paid by Western European importers in 2002, which roughly corresponds with ¯gures
of 115 $/tcm for revenues net of taxes given in Stern (2005) based on Gazprom's
income statements | though International Energy Agency (2003) gives much lower
prices of 100 $/tcm. As to the slope of demand, we assume a rather °at schedule. In
the short-term, Russia is bound by contractual obligations and cannot raise export
prices if some transport links become unavailable. In the long-term, it faces supply
competition from other gas producers, such as Algeria Norway, and LNG exporters.
Somewhat dated estimates for the price elasticity of gas demand are in the range of
1.5 { 2 (Pindyck (1979)). To account for contract coverage and competing suppliers
28Suppose the total cost of supplying and transporting gas to a point y is T(y). The increase of
cost from transporting it a little further is proportional to c+m+g¢T(y). Solve T
0 = c+m+g¢T,
use T(0) = MC0 and deduct the initial value MC0 to obtain the formula.
35our base line parameters for the inverse demand, an intercept of 160 $/tcm and slope
of ¡0:33, imply an elasticity of almost 4 at the pro¯t maximizing quantity. As to the
marginal cost of gas at the Russian export node, we assume an intercept of 11 $/tcm
re°ecting low production cost from old ¯elds such as Urengoy or Zapolyarnoye, for
which development cost are sunk. With the low intercept, we need a rather high
slope parameter of 0:8 to make the quantities which can be delivered through South
and Yamal 1 optimal. Such a steep increase of cost can, in principle, be justi¯ed
by the very high cost of the development of new ¯elds like Yamal or Shtokman.29
To sum up, our baseline variant, p(x) = 160[$=tcm] ¡ 0:33[$=mcm/a] ¢ x[bcm/a]
and MC0(x) = 11[$=tcm] + 0:8[$=mcm/a] ¢ x[bcm/a], yields reasonable ¯gures for
prices and elasticities at observed quantities, which would be optimal given our
assumptions on capacities and transportation cost.
B Robustness
In the following we report some results of the robustness checks. Given the wide
di®erence between the values of the status quo game and the all options game, we
¯rst look at the impact of delay and discounting. In the baseline case (reported in the
¯rst column of table 6) we assume 4 years delay and a discount rate of 0.1. The next
two columns feature the results for 5 years & 0.15 and 3 years & 5%, respectively.
By increasing delay and discount rate we put more weight on the short{term status
quo assessment, which decreases Russia's share by almost 5 points. We obtain the
opposite e®ect as we emphasize the long{term perspective.
Against the baseline variant of the composed game we also check the robustness
with respect to three parameter changes: (i) a higher demand, (ii) a lower elasticity
of demand, and (iii) higher investment cost of Nord Stream. Prices have increased
considerably since the beginning of the new century, for which we calibrated the
model. Therefore, we consider the impact of an upward shift of demand by 80 $
/tcm, or more than 60% evaluated at the old equilibrium price. Such a dramatic
increase of demand warrants an increase of transport capacities by 44%. The Grand
coalition would invest in Upgrade, adding 15 bcm/a to the southern system, and
build Yamal 2 with another 28 bcm/a. The shift has a substantial impact on the
power structure. Additional capacities tend to diminish the role of existing pipelines,
29For long-term perspectives of Russian gas production and its cost see Stern (1995) and Obser-
vatoire Mediterraneen de L'Energie (2002).
36Table 6: Robustness of Power Indices








Russia 74.5 69.7 79.1 77.4 75.5 70.4
Ukraine 16.8 20.9 12.8 14.7 16.3 18.8
Belarus 6.5 7.7 5.3 6.0 6.2 7.4
Poland 1.4 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.3 2.2
Slovakia 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Lithuania 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
Latvia 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
aInverse demand: p(x) = 160 ¡ 0:33x, "(98) = ¡3:9; delay: ¿ = 4; discount rate: r = 0:1
bMore balanced towards the status quo game: ¿ = 5, r = 0:15
cMore balanced towards the all options game: ¿ = 3, r = 0:05
dUpward shift of 60% at old equilibrium price: p(x) = 240 ¡ 0:33x, "(141) = ¡4:1
eReduction of elasticity by a quarter: p(x) = 170 ¡ 0:43x, "(98) = ¡3:0
fIncrease of investment cost by 50%.
for which investment cost are sunk. This acts to the relative disadvantage of Ukraine
and Belarus and increases Russia's power index from 74.5 to 77.4.
In our baseline variant we assume a price elasticity of 3.9 at the equilibrium quantity.
To check the robustness, we consider a decrease of the elasticity down to 3.0. As the
elasticity of demand decreases, it becomes more di±cult for customers to substitute
Russian gas for gas from other regions or other fuels. Such a change tends to favor
Russia, because coalitions, which rely on more expensive pipelines, hence choose
lower quantities, are partially compensated by a steeper increase in price. As the
¯gures in table 6 show, the quantitative e®ects on the power index are of minor
importance.
The direct access, Nord Stream, is the most expensive option to increase transport
capacities. Due to its large o®shore section, the cost of the pipeline are also most
uncertain. The last column in table 6 shows the results for a 50% increase of the
Nord Stream's investment cost. Compared to the base line case Russia loses 4 points.
The relative change is signi¯cant, but it is smaller by order of magnitude than the
relative change of the parameter.
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38Dear Kenneth
Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to resubmit our paper.
Attached is the revised version of the paper. Below we explain how we responded
to the remaining comments:
1.) There is a misunderstanding. We do calculate the solution of the general game
as the weighted average of the solutions of the two extreme games. Let Ã be a
solution for a game and v1 and v2 be two value functions. Our approach is valid i®:
Ã(®v1 + (1 ¡ ®)v2) = ®Ã(v1) + (1 ¡ ®)Ã(v2)
This property of Ã is commonly referred to as linearity. The Shapley value is the
only solution, which enjoys this property. So there is a potential problem only with
core and nucleolus. Fortunately, for `Big Boss Games', the nucleolus is the center of
the core, and given by:
Ãi = 0:5(v(N) ¡ v(N fig)
which is obviously linear in v.
To avoid the misunderstanding, we recalled the linearity of the Shapley value when
introducing the solution and added footnotes (pages 10, 11).
1./6. Before presenting the results for core and nucleolus we added a paragraph
(replacing the footnote) where we explain in more detail why our calibration result
in a Big Boss Game, and how this simpli¯es the calculation of core and nucleolus
(page 18).
2. We disagree. We assume that in the real world, players cooperate to create surplus
and compete when dividing it. We interpret the resulting shares as bargaining
power. We then ask, which of the theoretical solutions ¯t the data of this particular
case better, and conclude that "real world" competition deviates from the core. All
solutions (Shapley, core, nucleolus) assume the same about the success of cooperation
(we always divide v(N)) but they di®er in the division, that is the competitive part.
Apparently the referee is convinced that the core is the correct model for competition
anyway: If the data don't ¯t, then there is deviation from competition. We prefer
the more cautious statement, that there is deviation from the core.
By the way we don't see any independent explanation, why the two countries should
not vigorously compete. (As a matter of fact: it is Russia and Belarus, not Ukraine
and Belarus, which have a political union).
3. We adjusted the sentence to avoid the misunderstanding.
394. We took out the sentence and adjusted the tone.
5. We added the brackets here and, hopefully, at all the other places where there
were missing.
6. see above.
Best regards
Franz
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